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1 
Universal Banking and Conflicts of Interest:  
Evidence from German Initial Public Offerings 
 
 
Recent consolidation in the financial-services industry has brought renewed interest in uni-
versal banks, financial intermediaries that perform both commercial and investment banking. In 
principle, universal banks can exploit economies of scope in production and consumption and 
can benefit from the creation of internal capital markets. By closely monitoring their portfolio 
companies, universal banks can also improve the quality of corporate governance (Roe, 1994). 
However, critics associate universal or “relationship” banking with excessive risk, moral hazard 
created by the expectation of government bailouts, monetary instability, the concentration of po-
litical and economic power, a lack of consumer choice and availability of credit, and other prob-
lems (Francke and Hudson, 1984; Benston, 1994). While several of these concerns have more to 
do with bank size than universal banking per se, financial conglomeration nonetheless raises 
some special concerns.  
This paper examines the double role of lender and underwriter by comparing universal-bank-
underwritten initial public offerings (IPOs) with IPOs underwritten by specialized banks. To in-
vestigate potential conflicts of interest between underwriters, issuers, and investors, we study 
270 recent German IPOs and relate initial returns (underpricing) and aftermarket performance to 
the type of underwriter. German banks have traditionally been allowed to perform a wide variety 
of financial services, making the German banking system an excellent setting for investigating 
these issues. Moreover, despite the common perception that large universal banks dominate the 
credit sector in Germany, specialized financial institutions are also active in the German market.  
How does universal-bank underwriting differ from underwriting by specialized investment 
banks? Because relationships between universal banks and firms often go back many years, pos-
sibly from the firm’s first bank loan, universal banks may have information useful for underwrit-
ing that specialized underwriters do not possess. Do banks use this information to promote “cher-
ries”—i.e., does universal-bank affiliation certify quality—or do they push “lemons,” trying to 
transfer their loan risk to uninformed investors? Universal banks could also extend credit at fa-
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vorable rates to third-party investors in the understanding they will buy securities in the IPO.1 
The bank might also be inclined to make imprudent loans to issuers to avoid the impression that 
it performed insufficient due-diligence investigations before the IPO and to avoid litigation from 
shareholders.2 Of course, the market could potentially resolve these conflicts by tying executive 
compensation to the profit of the bank, imposing internal control mechanisms, relying on third-
party monitoring mechanisms, establishing self-regulating institutions, or imposing appropriate 
discounts on universal-bank-underwritten IPOs. Moreover, competition among issuers and the 
bank’s desire to maintain a reputation for trustworthiness (particularly in the face of disclosure 
requirements) are likely to constrain such opportunistic behavior (Minsky, 1996).3 
Ber, Yafeh, and Yosha’s (2001) study of universal banking in the Israeli IPO market finds 
evidence for certification: issuers whose IPOs were underwritten by their own universal-bank 
lenders exhibited above average accounting performance following their issues. Gande et al. 
(1997) find some evidence for certification when they compare debt securities underwritten by 
Section 20 subsidiaries of U.S. bank holding companies to those underwritten by investment 
houses. They find evidence of a net certification effect for bank holding companies: compared 
with specialized investment banks, holding-company subsidiaries set abnormally high subscrip-
tion prices for risky firms that receive loans from the bank. By contrast, Hamao and Hoshi’s 
(2002) study of Japanese corporate bonds finds that investors discount bonds underwritten by 
bank-owned subsidiaries relative to bonds underwritten by securities firms. 
                                                          
1 Specialized investment banks are also subject to these temptations. In 2002 U.S. regulators began investigating 
allegations that Salomon Smith Barney, CFSB, and other investment banks distributed pre-IPO shares of highly de-
sirable issues to corporate executives with the expectations that they would return the favor by steering investment-
banking business to the underwriter (“spinning”). 
2 Practitioners often argue that investment bankers underprice IPOs to reduce their exposure to shareholder litigation 
(Tinic, 1988; Hughes and Thakor, 1992; Drake and Vetsuypens, 1993; Nanda and Yun, 1997). If an issue is difficult 
to price and associated with observable risks, the investment bank would be expected to detect those in its due-
diligence investigation, state them clearly in the prospectus, and price appropriately. The investment bank might err 
on the side of caution to avoid overpricing lawsuits from shareholders. 
3 Chemmanur and Fulghierei (1994a, 1994b) show that investment-bank credibility depends on their equity-
marketing history. They also show that commercial banks’ desire to acquire and maintain a reputation for reliability 
provides an incentive to invest heavily in client evaluations. 
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Empirical studies of U.S. universal banking before the Glass-Steagall Act find mixed results 
on the effects of universal-bank underwriting. Kroszner and Rajan (1994) compare the ex-post 
performance of securities underwritten by commercial banks and nonbank investment houses, 
finding no evidence that commercial banks systematically fooled the public securities markets. 
Instead, there is some evidence that the markets have rationally discounted for potential conflicts 
associated with universal banking.4 Ang and Richardson (1998) confirm this result. Puri (1994) 
studies long-term default performance of bank-underwritten issues as compared to non-bank-
underwritten issues before 1933, finding that bank-underwritten issues defaulted less than non-
bank underwritten issues. Puri (1996) examines the pricing of bank-underwritten and non-bank-
underwritten securities, finding that investors were willing to pay higher prices for securities un-
derwritten by banks rather than investment houses. A comparison of in-house investment de-
partments and affiliated outside investment banks does not indicate greater conflicts of interest 
for the in-house underwriters. Kroszner and Rajan (1997), by contrast, find that in-house depart-
ments underwrote seemingly higher-quality securities than did comparable affiliates, but ob-
tained lower prices for the issues they underwrote, indicating that rational investors required a 
risk premium.  
Gompers and Lerner (1999) investigate contemporary underwriter affiliation with venture 
capital firms—a situation partly analogous to universal banking—and find evidence of a discount 
related to those affiliations. Several recent studies (Franzke, 2001; Mayer, 2001; Kraus, 2002; 
Tykvová, 2003) investigate the relationship between IPO underpricing and venture-capital back-
ing on the German “Neuer Markt,” a segment of the Frankfurt stock exchange reserved for 
young, growth-oriented firms, primarily in the technology sector.5 They find that venture-backed 
issues are typically more heavily underpriced than non-venture-backed issues. None of these 
                                                          
4 Specifically, Kroszner and Rajan (1994) find that universal-bank-underwritten securities were discounted in “in-
formation-intensive” cases—i.e., junior securities and securities of younger, smaller, and less well-known firms. 
5 In September 2002 the German stock exchange announced that the Neuer Markt would be closed by the end of 
2003. 
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German studies focuses on universal banking, however, and they exclude a substantial number of 
new issues listed on the traditional market. 
To see how investors perceive universal-bank underwriting in Germany we study the rela-
tionship between underpricing, issue and issuer characteristics, aftermarket performance of the 
stock, and underwriter type for a broad sample of German IPOs from 1997 to 1999. If investors 
are naive, we expect universal-bank-underwritten securities to be associated with average under-
pricing and below-average aftermarket performance, controlling for issue and issuer characteris-
tics. If universal banks underprice to promote their other services, we expect lower-than-average 
subscription prices (higher-than-average underpricing) and average or better-than-average after-
market performance. If investors are rational and worried about conflicts of interest, we expect 
lower-than-average subscription prices (higher-than-average underpricing) and average after-
market performance, ceteris paribus. If investors see universal banks as certifiers of high quality, 
we expect higher-than-average subscription prices (lower-than-average underpricing) and aver-
age or superior aftermarket stock performance.  
We find that universal-bank underwriting is correlated with above-average first-day returns 
(underpricing), but uncorrelated with long-term performance. This suggests that underpricing 
compensates for potential conflicts of interest. We then ask why issuers choose underwriters who 
raise less cash in the initial offering and find observable issuer characteristics such as size, lever-
age, ownership, and industry are generally unrelated to the choice of underwriter. This suggests 
that unobservable issuer-specific characteristics, which could include preexisting bank relation-
ships, may determine the choice of underwriter. One possible explanation of underwriter choice 
is preexisting relationships combined with high switching costs. If some issuers have preexisting 
relationships with particular underwriters, such as a debt relationship with a universal bank, then 
switching costs might outweigh the cost of leaving money on the table by using the universal 
bank as underwriter. Unfortunately, while we have data on the amount of issuer debt, we cannot 
match this debt with particular lenders, so it is difficult to test this interpretation conclusively.  
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The next section summarizes the literature on underpricing and universal banking. Section I 
describes our empirical approach. Section II presents the results, and section III concludes.  
I. Data and Methods 
To see how universal-bank underwriting affects IPO performance we investigate all 270 
IPOs to the German stock market from January 1997 to December 1999. We include IPOs on 
both the Neuer Markt and the traditional market.6 Our analysis relates the initial returns (under-
pricing) and the aftermarket returns to the type of underwriter and a set of issuer characteristics. 
The German stock exchange (Deutsche Börse AG) publishes information on issue dates, sub-
scription prices, first-day-closing prices, issuer industry, issuer revenue, lead underwriters, sec-
ondary market prices, and venture capital investments. All other information about the issuers, 
including the distribution of debt, is collected from the issuers’ prospectuses. Unfortunately, 
some firms did not report pre-IPO issuer debt, and we generally do not know the identities of the 
lenders. Thus we do not know if leveraged issuers with universal-bank underwriters have preex-
isting relationships with their own underwriter, or with another bank. However, this information 
is also unavailable to investors, who may use total debt as a proxy for a potential conflict of in-
terest between the issuer and the underwriter. 
After a careful review of each underwriter’s product offerings we classify a bank as a univer-
sal bank if it performs both commercial and investment banking. In recent years the demand for 
investment-banking services has prompted a number of banks to advertise themselves as special-
ists in this area. However, we designate a bank as a specialized investment bank only if the pri-
mary SIC code of the institution indicates investment-banking services, the balance sheet of the 
underwriter indicates no income from lending business, and the bank’s self-description suggests 
that it does not have commercial- or retail-banking subsidiaries. With these criteria, we designate 
                                                          
6 We include only newly public firms in our sample, excluding a handful of existing public companies that made 
initial listings on the German exchange. 
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20 percent of the IPOs in our sample as being underwritten by specialized banks.7 Table I lists 
the 52 banks involved with IPOs during our sample period. Several banks underwrote only one 
IPO; DG Bank, Deutsche Bank, and Dresdner Bank, the most active lead underwriters in the 
sample, underwrote 30, 29, and 26, respectively.8 
[Table I about here] 
Underpricing is defined as the difference between the first-day closing price and the sub-
scription price as a percentage of the subscription price. As is common in the literature on IPOs 
we measure aftermarket performance using buy-and-hold returns.9 Because our sample covers all 
of 1999 we focus on 30-month, rather than the more conventional 36-month, returns. We com-
pute both simple buy-and-hold returns (the difference between the price after 30 months of trad-
ing and the price at the end of the first trading day, divided by the price at the end of the first 
trading day) and adjusted abnormal returns using the broad-market DAFOX index developed by 
Göppl and Schütz (1993). The abnormal return is defined as the natural logarithm of (1 + the 
buy-and-hold return) minus the natural logarithm of (1 + the percentage change in the DAFOX 
index during the period in question).10 To account for time- and cohort-specific effects we in-
clude time dummies (quarters or years) in all our regressions. 
We also collect information that proxies for unobservable issuer-specific risk. As is common 
in the IPO literature, issue size is used to proxy for the level of information available about the 
                                                          
7 Conflicts of interest may arise if any of these criteria are violated. We considered two alternative approaches to 
classifying the relationship between issuer and underwriter: (1) gathering data on the value and duration of each 
preexisting lending relationship, and (2) computing the ratio of interest income to noninterest (fee-based) income for 
each underwriter and using a cut-off point to distinguish between specialized and diversified banks. Neither alterna-
tive, in our view, captures the potential for conflicts of interest as well as the definition described in the text.  
8 Unfortunately, we cannot determine the precise lending relationship between the commercial-banking subsidiaries 
of the universal banks and the IPO clients. In other words, an investment-banking subsidiary could be underwriting 
securities for firms that have no preexisting lending relationships with the bank’s commercial-banking subsidiary. 
Because these relationships are also unknown to investors, we assume that rational investors will suspect the possi-
bility of conflicts of interests when the underwriter is a universal bank. 
9 See, for example, Loughran and Ritter, 1996. 
10 The logarithmic transformation is used because the distribution of returns—with a lower bound of –0.99 and no 
upper bound—is highly skewed. 
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issuer (Ritter, 1987; Tinic, 1988). Venture capital affiliation is also correlated with risk. Because 
venture capital firms are particularly well suited to provide third-party certification, the ability to 
acquire venture capital can be an indicator of high quality (Chan, 1983; Brav and Gompers, 
1997), Venture capital firms depend to some extent on access to the IPO market on favorable 
terms and on establishing enduring relationships with pension fund managers and other institu-
tional investors. For this reason they have strong incentives to establish reputations for trustwor-
thiness (Sahlmann, 1990; Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Admati and Pfleiderer, 1994). Barry et al. 
(1990) document that venture capital firms specialize in portfolio firms to provide intensive 
monitoring services, taking concentrated equity positions, maintaining investments beyond the 
IPO, and serving on boards. They, as well as Megginson and Weiss (1991), find that venture 
capital backing results in significantly lower initial returns. In addition, the presence of a venture 
capitalist lowers the total costs of going public and helps maximize the net proceeds to the offer-
ing firm. Venture capital-backed issuers can also work with better auditors and receive greater 
attention from institutional investors.  
To capture third-party certification we collect data on the pre-IPO ownership percentage of a 
venture capital firm and include this as a control variable in our regressions.11 To distinguish 
third- from first-party certification we also create a dummy variable representing an affiliation 
between a venture capital firm and one of the (lead) underwriters. Unlike the situation in the U.S. 
or U.K., German venture capital is often provided by financial intermediaries (see Kraus, 2001, 
for details). Twenty-six issuers in our sample use underwriters with an affiliation to a venture 
capital firm or with ownership of pre-IPO equity. These affiliations are found both for universal 
banks and for specialized banks, but specialized banks are overrepresented in this category. The 
affiliations could thus be interpreted as a substitute for a lending relationship. 
Table II provides descriptive statistics for our sample. The table provides means and medians 
for underpricing, long-term performance, issue size, pre-IPO ownership of a venture capital firm, 
issuer’s pre-IPO revenue, and issuer’s pre-IPO total debt. The means and medians are reported 
                                                          
11 We include directly held bank equity stakes in this category. 
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separately for universal-bank-underwritten IPOs and IPOs underwritten by specialized invest-
ment banks. The third column of the table reports the results of a series of univariate tests for dif-
ferences in means and medians between the two types of IPOs (t-tests for means and rank-sum 
tests for medians). 
[Table II about here] 
As seen in the table, universal-bank-underwritten IPOs have an average first-day return of 
44.3 percent, compared with 26.3 percent for the IPOs underwritten by specialized investment 
banks. The medians are 13.9 percent and 5.3 percent, respectively. The differences in both means 
and medians are statistically significantly different from zero. Long-term performance is poor for 
both types of IPO, with little difference between the two types. The average unadjusted buy-and-
hold returns are –53.0 percent for the universal-bank-underwritten IPOs and –61.2 percent for 
the IPOs underwritten by specialized investment banks, with medians of –78.5 percent and –74.7 
percent, respectively. (Neither the differences in means nor the differences in medians are statis-
tically significant.) Median issue size is about the same for both types of IPO (€32.2 million and 
€26.1 million, respectively), though specialized investment banks tend to underwrite the very 
largest issues, pushing the average issue size for those IPOs to €116.6 million, compared with 
€54.1 million for the universal-bank-underwritten IPOs (the difference is significant at the 1 per-
cent level).12 
Venture capital backing appears unrelated to underwriter type: average pre-IPO ownership 
by a venture capital firm is close to 8 percent for both types of IPOs. If universal-bank affiliation 
and venture backing are alternative forms of certification, then venture-backed issuers should 
tend to select specialized investment banks. However, these issues are distributed equally be-
tween the two underwriter types. 
                                                          
12 The largest and most important German IPO, that of Deutsche Telekom, took place in 1996, too early to be in-
cluded in our sample. (Deutsche Telekom made secondary and tertiary offerings in 1999 and 2000, respectively.) 
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Finally, issuer characteristics like pre-IPO revenue and debt do not differ strongly between 
bank types. Larger issuers tend to select specialized investment banks, though the differences in 
average and median issue size are not statistically significant. Highly leveraged firms do tend to 
choose specialized underwriters; pre-IPO total debt averages €10.6 for universal-bank-
underwritten IPOs and €30.9 for IPOs underwritten by specialized investment banks (the differ-
ence is significant at the 10 percent level). Median leverage is about the same for the two groups, 
however. 
The table also gives information on issuer industry. Of the 270 IPOs during this period, 187 
(70 percent) were listed on the Neuer Markt. Universal banks tended to focus more heavily on 
the Neuer Markt than did the specialized investment banks; 72 percent of all universal-bank-
underwritten IPOs were listed on the Neuer Markt, while only 57 percent of the IPOs underwrit-
ten by specialized investment banks were Neuer Mark listings. Over half the IPOs during this 
period were in software (including Internet applications and services) and technology. Other im-
portant sectors include financial services, communications, and pharmaceuticals. Eighty-six per-
cent of all IPOs during this period were in these five industries. 
II. Results 
A. Underpricing 
Table III reports results of two sets of OLS regressions of underpricing on the universal-bank 
dummy and controls for venture-capital backing, issue size, and Neuer Markt listing.13 The sec-
ond regression in each set also includes industry dummies defined at the 2-digit SIC level. The 
first set of regressions uses the full sample of IPOs, while the second set uses a restricted sample 
of 120 IPOs for which we have data on the issuer’s pre-IPO debt.14 For this second set of regres-
sions we also include an interaction term between the universal-bank dummy and the issuer’s 
                                                          
13 The Neuer Markt dummy is important because a Neuer Markt listing required a six-month lockup period, which 
the traditional exchanges did not require. We do not include dummy variables for the issue method because all but 
six of our 270 IPOs were priced by bookbuilding. 
14 In the remaining 150 cases the issuer’s pre-IPO debt was not reported on the prospectus. 
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debt ratio (total debt to revenue, as reported prior to issue). For universal-bank-underwritten 
IPOs the issuer’s pre-IPO debt is a reasonable proxy for the size of the potential conflict of inter-
est between underwriter and investors. For IPOs underwritten by specialized investment banks 
we have no reason to suspect a relationship between debt and underpricing.15 All regressions in-
clude time-fixed effects.  
[Table III about here] 
The coefficient on the universal-bank dummy is positive and statistically significant in the 
first two regressions, indicating that universal-bank underwriting is associated with higher-than-
average underpricing, controlling for observable issue- and issuer-specific characteristics. 
Higher-than-average underpricing is inconsistent with the certification hypothesis: universal 
banks, as a group, are not selling securities at higher-than-average prices. The finding is also in-
consistent with the naive-investor hypothesis, in which banks exploit their informational advan-
tages at the expense of investors. The findings are consistent with the hypothesis that investors 
impose discounts for possible conflicts of interest: in this case, investors require compensation 
for the potential hazards associated with universal-bank underwriting.  
In the third and fourth regression the coefficient on the universal-bank dummy is not signifi-
cant, but the coefficient on the interaction term between universal-bank underwriting and issuer’s 
pre-IPO total debt is positive and significant. Again, this is consistent with the discount-for-
conflicts-of-interest explanation for universal-bank underwriting. Firms that choose a universal 
bank as underwriter but have little pre-IPO debt are unlikely to have a preexisting relationship 
with the underwriter, and investors have no reason to be concerned about conflicts of interest in 
this case. As the issuer’s pre-IPO debt increases, however, the discount associated with univer-
sal-bank underwriting rises, consistent with the view that investors are wary of preexisting rela-
tionships between issuer and underwriter. 
                                                          
15 As described above, unlike the sample of Israeli IPOs studied by Ber, Yafeh, and Yosha (2001), our sample does 
not include the lenders’ identities, which was generally not reported on the issuer prospectuses. 
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The coefficient on the dummy variable for venture capital-backing is positive and statistically 
significant in three of the four regressions, confirming what Franzke (2001), Mayer (2001), and 
Tykvová (2003) find for Neuer Markt IPOs: venture-backed issues are discounted more heavily 
than non-venture-backed issues, suggesting that investors do not take venture-capital backing as 
a signal of quality. The proxy for risk is consistent with our expectations: larger issues are asso-
ciated with lower-than-average underpricing, indicating that investors consider those issues to be 
safer (the coefficient on issue size is statistically significant in only one of the four regressions, 
however).16 Overall, the results are consistent with the claim that investors see preexisting rela-
tionships—whether due to universal banking or not—as a potential source of conflicts of interest. 
The initial returns earned for IPOs underwritten by both venture capital affiliates and universal 
banks could also be interpreted as up-front compensation for these hazards.  
These results show that universal-bank-underwritten IPOs are associated with lower average 
subscription prices, inconsistent with the certification hypothesis. However, some universal 
banks are larger, older, and more prestigious than others. Universal banks as a group do not ap-
pear to certify quality, but some universal banks may do so. Carter and Manaster (1990) and oth-
ers suggest that high-quality issuers choose prestigious underwriters to signal their low risk in-
stead of discounting the value of the firm. Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998) find that the underper-
formance of IPOs relative to the market over a three-year holding period is less severe for IPOs 
handled by a more prestigious underwriter. That paper, along with Schmidt et al. (1988) and 
Michaely and Shaw (1994), find that issuers with high-reputation underwriters are associated 
with lower underpricing; Jain and Kini (1999) find that higher investment-banker prestige also 
increases the firm’s survival probability.17 Underwriter reputation can thus substitute for under-
pricing as a means of reassuring investors. 
                                                          
16 Because specialized investment banks tend to underwrite the largest IPOs, the regressions reported in Table 3 
could be contaminated by multicollinearity. To check for this we run the regressions again, this time omitting issue 
size. The results on the other variables are similar to those reported in the table, so multicollinearity does not appear 
to be a problem. 
17 Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (1999) show, for the U.S., that additional analyst coverage provided by the invest-
ment bank, and higher bank reputation, help determine the issuer’s choice of underwriter. 
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To further examine the certification hypothesis we rerun the regressions reported in Table III, 
this time using dummy variables for individual underwriters instead of a universal-bank dummy. 
(Because we have 52 underwriters and only 270 observations, we included dummies only for the 
ten most active underwriters.18) Interestingly, the coefficients on three of the underwriter dum-
mies, those for Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, and Concord Effekten, are negative and statisti-
cally significant, meaning that these particular underwriters set above-average subscription 
prices. None of the coefficients on the other underwriter dummies are statistically significant. 
Because these banks, particularly Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank, are among the largest (and 
most reputable) universal banks, this could indicate that issues underwritten by “high-quality” 
banks are perceived to be less risky, on average, than issues underwritten by other universal 
banks. In other words, underpricing and reputation may be substitute mechanisms to protect in-
vestors from the hazards associated with universal-bank underwriting. This finding also casts 
doubt on the claim that universal banks offer discounted securities to reward their own investing 
clients and asset-management subsidiaries. Of the universal banks in the sample, one would ex-
pect the banks with the greatest variety of products, depositors, and mutual fund subsidiaries—
banks such as Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank—to engage in this practice. The most diversi-
fied banks, however, tend to set higher-than-average subscription prices. 
B. Aftermarket Performance 
If the long-term performance of universal-bank-underwritten securities is average, then their 
higher-than-average underpricing may be interpreted as an up-front risk premium that compen-
sates investors for underwriter-specific conflicts of interest. If universal-bank-underwritten secu-
rities perform poorly in the long run, however, then this underpricing is better interpreted as up-
front compensation for (unobservable) issuer-specific risk. To distinguish between these possi-
bilities we turn next to the long-term performance of universal-bank-underwritten IPOs and IPOs 
underwritten by specialized investment banks. 
                                                          
18 We also omitted the industry dummies from this specification. 
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Table IV reports two pairs of OLS regressions of aftermarket buy-and-hold returns on the 
universal-bank dummy and control variables. The dependent variable in the first two columns is 
the unadjusted 30-month buy-and-hold return, defined as log (1 + [(p1 − p0) / p0]), where p0 is the 
price at the end of the first trading day and p1 is the price after 30 months. The dependent vari-
able in the third and fourth columns is the unadjusted buy-and-hold return minus the equivalent 
30-month return on the DAFOX index. These returns assume that all dividends are reinvested to 
purchase additional shares. This assumption is innocuous for Neuer Markt firms, most of which 
paid no dividends. Moreover, because we include a dummy variable for Neuer Markt issues in 
our regressions, the inclusion of some dividend-paying firms from the traditional exchange 
should not bias our coefficient estimates. All four regressions include controls for venture capital 
backing and issue size, and the regressions reported in the second and fourth columns include 2-
digit SIC industry dummies. 
[Table IV about here] 
As Table IV shows, neither the unadjusted buy-and-hold returns nor the DAFOX-adjusted 
abnormal returns are systematically related to underwriter type. In the secondary markets, IPOs 
underwritten by universal banks cannot be distinguished from IPOs underwritten by specialized 
investment banks. Venture-backed issues tend to perform worse than non-venture-backed issues, 
however. Combined with the results presented in Table III, this suggests that universal banks are 
systematically discounting IPOs that are otherwise indistinguishable (in the long run) from other 
IPOs. Investors are concerned about potential conflicts of interest associated with these under-
writers and require appropriate compensation for bearing this risk. 
In a separate set of regressions (not reported here) with underwriter dummies instead of a 
dummy for universal-bank underwriting, we again find substantial variation among individual 
underwriters. The coefficient for Deutsche-Bank-underwritten IPOs is positive and statistically 
significant, indicating that the negative and statistically significant coefficient on underpricing 
reflects high quality issues, not an attempt to cross-subsidize or to float low-quality issues at high 
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subscription prices. The Dresdner Bank coefficient is also positive but not statistically signifi-
cant, suggesting that the aftermarket returns of those IPOs are normal. These two large universal 
banks can underwrite average or superior securities at higher subscription prices. In contrast to 
the group of universal banks as a whole, these banks appear to select their IPO candidates and to 
control the potential conflicts of interest associated with their double role as lender and under-
writer.  
C. Choice of Underwriter 
Our results raise a puzzling question: Why do clients of average universal banks accept lower 
subscription prices? Why would a firm choose a universal bank or a bank with a venture capital 
affiliation as underwriter, knowing these issues raise less capital than issues underwritten by spe-
cialized and unaffiliated underwriters, even for stocks that are otherwise indistinguishable in the 
secondary markets? More generally, why do banks in Europe and elsewhere seek to integrate 
commercial and investment banking?  
One possible explanation is self-selection: lower-quality issuers tend to select universal 
banks. Indeed, our underpricing results could be driven not by inherent problems associated with 
relationship banking, but by unobserved heterogeneity—different types of underwriter system-
atically underwrite different types of securities. Of course, our underpricing and long-term per-
formance regressions control for observable risks, and the long-term performance results do not 
indicate that universal banks underwrite low-quality issues. Alternatively, underwriter choice 
could depend on switching costs and the issuer’s desire to protect its private information. Rela-
tionship banking offers the client not only one-stop banking and reduced transaction costs but 
also confidentiality. Saunders and Srinivasan (2001) show that switching costs increase a client’s 
propensity to keep an underwriter for repeat issues and as adviser. Banks enticing clients to 
switch underwriters typically offer free services to compensate for the switching costs incurred 
by clients that make firm-specific information available to a new bank. For these reasons, firms 
may choose a universal bank or venture capital-affiliated bank simply because they have an on-
going relationship with the bank. 
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To see what leads issuers to choose universal banks as underwriters we estimate a probit 
model of underwriter type on a set of issuer characteristics including the pre-IPO ownership of a 
venture capital firm, the issuer’s pre-IPO revenue (a proxy for firm size as well as firm age), the 
issuer’s pre-IPO total debt (relative to revenue), and a dummy for Neuer Markt issues.19 Table V 
reports the results of four specifications of the probit model. The specifications reported in the 
first and third columns include the four variables described above, with and without industry 
dummies. The specifications reported in the second and fourth columns add issue size, which is 
an issuer characteristic to the extent that the issuer decides how much capital to raise before se-
lecting an underwriter.  
[Table V about here] 
As seen in Table V, issuer characteristics such as venture backing, size, leverage, and indus-
try are generally poor predictors of underwriter choice. The only statistically significant predic-
tors of underwriter type are issue size, which is negative (suggesting that specialized investment 
banks are better positioned to underwrite the largest issues), and the Neuer Markt dummy, which 
is positive (suggesting that Neuer Markt issues, which tend to be smaller than issues on the tradi-
tional market, are unlikely to choose a specialized investment bank). Surprisingly, the coeffi-
cients on the debt variables are not statistically significant. If debt is a good proxy for a preexist-
ing lending relationship with a universal bank, then one might expect highly leveraged firms to 
choose universal banks as underwriters, preferring to leave money on the table to avoid switch-
ing costs. Our findings do not bear out this explanation. 
However, the amount of debt may be a poor proxy for preexisting bank relationships, particu-
larly given that we cannot always distinguish in our sample between bank debt and commercial 
paper. An alternative interpretation of Table V is that unobservable issuer-specific characteris-
tics, which could include preexisting bank relationships, determine the choice of underwriter. If 
some issuers have preexisting relationships with particular underwriters, such as a debt relation-
                                                          
19 As mentioned above, the data on debt were collected from issuer prospectuses. Unfortunately, the information on 
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ship with a universal bank, then switching costs might outweigh the cost of leaving money on the 
table by using the universal bank as underwriter. Unfortunately, because we cannot match debt 
amounts with particular lenders, and thus cannot identify these relationships, it is difficult to test 
this interpretation conclusively.   
III. Conclusion 
This paper investigates the relationship between IPO underpricing, aftermarket IPO returns, 
and the lead underwriter’s bank structure. Universal banks face potential conflicts of interest 
when they underwrite equities because of their double role as lender and underwriter. The em-
pirical results presented here show that universal banks underwrite stocks that perform normally 
in the secondary markets, but they set lower-than-average subscription prices. This suggests that 
investors require compensation for potential conflicts of interest associated with universal bank-
ing. We also demonstrate that bank reputation can mitigate these conflicts of interest: the varia-
tion in underpricing and aftermarket performance among universal banks indicates self-selection 
of the better-quality issuers to the most reputable banks. Finally, the paper shows that observable 
issuer characteristics such as size, leverage, ownership, and industry are generally unrelated to 
the choice of underwriter, suggesting that other characteristics, such as preexisting bank relation-
ships, are more important. 
While the market recognizes that conflicts of interest can arise if commercial banking and in-
vestment banking are combined in one institution, our results suggest that investors are aware of 
these potential problems and require—and receive—an appropriate discount. For this reason, it 
seems unnecessary to prohibit the combination of commercial banking and investment banking 
to protect investors. The question of how banking services should be combined is best left to 
banks and issuers, who will weigh the benefits associated with combinations against the cost as-
sociated with lower capitalization in an IPO. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
bank debt and revenue was available only for 114 observations.  
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Further research is needed on the importance of preexisting banking relationships. Duration 
and relative volumes of loans could be proxies for the quality of information the relationships 
produce. It would also be interesting to relate this information to a measure of forgone IPO capi-
talization to infer the relative value of the relationship. Our understanding of such practices could 
also benefit from more extensive comparisons of investment-banking (and venture capital) rela-
tionships with lending relationships. Moreover, the relationships between IPO returns and par-
ent-firm sponsorship, corporate investors, and institutional investors might offer further insight 
into the role of these corporate monitors and their value as certifiers.  
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Table I: Sample Banks 
 
Firms in bold are universal banks; firms in italics are foreign (non-German) banks.  
 
 
Lead underwriter  IPOs  Lead underwriter  IPOs
     
Baader Wertpapierhandelsbank 5  HSBC Trinkhaus Burkhardt 7 
Baden Württembergische Bank 4  ICE 1 
BancBoston Robertson Stephens 1  J. Vontobel 2 
Bank Vontobel 3  J. Henry Schroder 1 
Bankgesellschaft Berlin 1  JP Morgan 1 
Bay. Hypobank 3  Kling, Jelko, Dr. Dehmel 3 
Bay. Landesbank 3  LB Baden Württemberg 2 
Bay. Vereinsbank 2  Lehman Brothers 2 
Bay. Hypo-und Vereinsbank 13  M.M. Warburg 3 
Berliner Effektenbank 4  Merck Finck & Co. 1 
Berliner Freiverkehr 4  Merrill 2 
BHF Bank 19  Metallbank 5 
Börsenmakler Schnigge 1  Morgan Stanley 3 
Commerzbank 15  Nord LB 4 
Concord Effekten 7  Paribas 3 
Credit Suisse First Boston 7  Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich 2 
Deutsche Bank 29  Robert Fleming 2 
DG Bank 30  Sal. Oppenheim 9 
Dresdner Bank 26  Salomon Smith Barney 1 
Fleming 1  Schmidt Bank 1 
German Brokers 1  SGZ  2 
Goldman Sachs 10  Soc. Generale 1 
Gontard 4  Stadtsparkasse Koeln 2 
Gontard & Metallbank 6  UBS 1 
Hanseatisches Wertpapierhandels 2  Vereins- und Westbank 3 
Hauck 1  West LB Panmure 15 
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Table II: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Means and medians for 270 German IPOs, 1997-99. P-values for difference tests given by t-test for means and rank-
sum test for medians. The abnormal return is defined as log (1 + [(p1 − p0) / p0]), where p0 is the price at the end of 
the first trading day and p1 is the price after 30 months, minus the equivalent 30-month return on the DAFOX index 
These returns assume all dividends are reinvested. 
 
 
   
  Universal banks
Specialized 
 investment 
banks 
 
 
P-value of
difference
Number of IPOs  221 49   
Underpricing (percent) Mean 44.343 26.319  (0.08) 
 Median 13.921 5.294  (0.08) 
Long-term buy-and-hold return Mean –53.020 –61.170  (0.45) 
  (30 months) (percent) Median –78.517 –74.651  (0.54) 
Abnormal return (30 months) Mean –1.729 –1.968  (0.30) 
 Median –1.640 –1.496  (0.56) 
Issue size (€ millions) Mean 54.097 116.611  (0.00) 
 Median 32.212 26.137  (0.19) 
Pre-IPO ownership of a venture- Mean 8.415 7.743  (0.79) 
  capital firm (percent) Median 0.000 0.000  (0.93) 
Issuer’s pre-IPO revenue Mean 167.835 199.716  (0.86) 
  (€ millions) Median 22.330 27.451  (0.43) 
Issuer’s pre-IPO total debt Mean 10.585 30.884  (0.05) 
  (€ millions) Median 0.899 1.354  (0.24) 
Percent of IPOs on Neuer Markt  72.0 57.1   
Percent of issuers in       
  Software  38.9 22.4   
  Technology  21.3 28.6   
  Finance  8.1 16.3   
  Communications  10.0 8.2   
  Pharmaceuticals  8.1 2.0   
  Retail trade  2.7 6.1   
  Electric equipment  1.8 6.1   
  Wholesale trade  1.8 0.0   
  Engineering  0.9 6.1   
  Miscellaneous manufacturing  4.5 2.0   
  All others  1.8 2.0   
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Table III: Underpricing 
 
OLS regressions of initial IPO returns on underwriter and issuer characteristics. The first two regressions use the full 
sample of 270 IPOs; the third and fourth regressions use a restricted sample of 120 IPOs for which we have data on 
the issuer’s pre-IPO total debt. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent 
statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. Year dummies included. 
 
 
Full sample Restricted sample 
Constant 0.201* 0.418* 0.482*** 0.284 
(0.103) (0.223) (0.175) (0.199) 
    
Dummy for universal-bank underwriter 0.167** 0.221** –0.024 –0.041 
(0.083) (0.099) (0.150) (0.150) 
    
Universal-bank underwriter * total debt —— —— 0.022** 0.019* 
   (0.009) (0.010) 
     
Dummy for venture-capital backing 0.228*** 0.247*** 0.189* 0.162 
 (0.083) (0.085) (0.112) (0.127) 
    
Issue size –0.030* –0.021 –0.033 –0.015 
(0.016) (0.021) (0.020) (0.018) 
    
Neuer Markt dummy –0.079 –0.082 –0.254* –0.206 
(0.089) (0.094) (0.140) (0.129) 
    
Industry dummies no yes no yes 
        
R2 0.07 0.15 0.11 0.28 
    
Number of observations 270 270 120 120 
  
 
24
Table IV: Long-Term Performance 
 
OLS regressions of aftermarket returns on issuer and bank characteristics. The dependent variable in the first two 
columns is the unadjusted 30-month buy-and-hold return, defined as log (1 + [(p1 − p0) / p0]), where p0 is the price at 
the end of the first trading day and p1 is the price after 30 months. The dependent variable in the third and fourth 
columns is the unadjusted buy-and-hold return minus the equivalent 30-month return on the DAFOX index. These 
returns assume all dividends are reinvested. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** 
and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. Dummies included for each 
quarter. 
 
 
 Buy-and-hold return Abnormal return 
Constant –2.332*** –3.418*** –2.362*** –3.433***
(0.370) (0.539) (0.368) (0.543) 
    
Dummy for universal-bank underwriter 0.221 0.242 0.231 0.252 
(0.247) (0.254) (0.247) (0.253) 
    
Dummy for venture-capital backing –0.494*** –0.525*** –0.496*** –0.529***
 (0.185) (0.174) (0.184) (0.173) 
    
Issue size 0.143*** 0.093 0.144*** 0.094 
(0.052) (0.056) (0.053) (0.058) 
    
Neuer Markt dummy 0.138 0.230 0.142 0.238 
(0.185) (0.179) (0.185) (0.179) 
    
Industry dummies no yes no yes 
        
R2 0.23 0.40 0.16 0.35 
    
Number of observations 261 261 261 261 
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Table V: Choice of Underwriter 
 
Probit regressions of underwriter choice on issuer characteristics. Dependent variable equals 1 if underwriter is a 
universal bank and zero otherwise. P-values in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 
5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. Year dummies included. 
 
 
Constant –1.449 0.827*** 0.409 0.596 
(0.229) (0.234) (0.666) (0.684) 
    
0.172 –0.033 0.269 0.090 Dummy for venture-capital  
backing (0.291) (0.307) (0.330) (0.342) 
    
Issuer’s pre-IPO revenue 0.002 0.009 0.012 0.015 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.017) 
    
Issuer’s pre-IPO total debt 0.059 –0.047 0.113 0.122 
(0.102) (0.095) (0.156) (0.184) 
    
Issue size —— –0.003** —— –0.002 
 (0.002)  (0.001) 
    
Neuer Markt dummy 0.650** 0.602** 0.910*** 0.860** 
(0.287) (0.299) (0.328) (0.339) 
    
Industry dummies no no yes yes 
    
Log-likelihood –52.22 –47.55 –42.86 –40.28 
    
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.15 0.21 0.26 
    
Number of observations 120 120 114 114 
 
